By: Liora Wren (Transiness Admin) transinessadmin@protonmail.com

Date: 5/10/25

Foreword:

If this Sussex Police policy were framed so that cis women could be stripped and searched by men, the outrage would be deafening. Women’s groups, unions and legal advocates would flood the media and courts calling it degrading, unlawful, a clear violation of dignity and bodily autonomy.

People would rightly say: “This is state-sanctioned sexual assault.”

The very reason PACE (the Police and Criminal Evidence Act) originally required “same-sex” officers for intimate searches was to protect women from exactly that. The idea that women’s bodies could be exposed, touched, or scrutinised by male officers was recognised as traumatising, dangerous, and unacceptable.

The “Searching Biological Sex Policy” is a carve-out, where people who transition are suddenly excluded from the protections that everyone should be able to rely on. That double standard make it feels violating: it reduces safety, threatens welfare, and sanctions abuse while holding cis women’s dignity as sacrosanct.

In this document we have critically appraised it for legality, cogency and objectivity that moves away from beliefs, be they those of officers, or the people they have pledged to serve and protect. While we understand that search and arrest by definition restricts human rights, we firmly believe that there is a way forward that provides the same level of rights, dignity, safeguarding and protection to both cisgender people, and those who change their bodies with hormones and surgery, regardless of how they identify.

It cannot be ignored that this policy has been constructed in the middle of a process of rolling back of TNBI people’s rights in the United Kingdom, and that the Lemkin Institute have declared a genocide warning for the United Kingdom at the end of June. We encourage you to read it. It is therefore not entirely surprising that such a draconian policy, based on a mis-interpretation of the law, codifies what we consider to be structural and institutional abuse. While the language here might be considered strong, so is the potential for irreparable harm that such a policy would cause to a tiny minority population, who are unable to defend themselves as they are overwhelmingly outnumbered.

As an organisation, we pride ourselves in supporting feminine people (regardless of how they identify) with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, and I hope that our work might provide some comfort for those most affected by this policy, but also to enlighten key policymakers of an alternative way forward that respects the rights and dignity of everyone.

[This document will be made available to all at www.transiness.com and www.transiness.co.uk on 7^th October 2025, after our member meets with Sussex Police.]

The Current Policy In Full

Before we discuss the current policy in full, we need to remind readers that its content is a traumatic read. We are mindful that some might have had poor experiences with the Police before, we are well aware that protection is not afforded equally to everyone, and that many have experienced physical and sexual violence before. It contains elements of coercion, and describes situations where people with biological and phenotypical presentations as women, would be “lawfully” stripped and touched by and in front of a group of men, in a situation in which they are powerless. We are providing this as a “content warning”, please do take care when reading.

Searching Biological Sex Policy (Surrey and Sussex) (1248/2025)

Abstract

This policy provides operational guidance for officers and designated police staff when
conducting searches where either the searching officer or detained person is
transgender.

Policy
1. Introduction
1.1 This policy provides operational searching guidance in relation to biological sex for
police officers and designated police staff.
1.2 While the operational guidance is based on legal definitions related to biological sex,
this policy applies to all individuals, including those who identify with genders that differ
from their biological sex, for example, transgender, gender fluid, and non-binary people.
1.3 This policy applies to all searches where, in law, the searching officer must be the
same sex as the person being searched.
1.4 This policy reflects the ruling for the Supreme Court Judgment in the case of For
Women Scotland Ltd (Appellant) v The Scottish Ministers [2025] which which stated that
under the Equality Act 2010 the term ‘sex’ means ‘biological sex’. This policy follows
extensive legal advice.
1.5 It ensures compliance with:
• The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984,
• The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),in particular Articles 3 and 8, and
• The Equality Act 2010.

2. Scope
2.1 The procedures associated with this policy detail the process to be followed in
relation to searching when considering biological sex for searches where, in law, the
searching officer must be the same sex as the person being searched.

3. Policy Statement
3.1 This policy will be reviewed in line with published timescales or by exception where
there is an extraordinary event which requires update.

Procedure

1. Key Definitions
1.1 Detained Person: A person subject to a stop and search or having been arrested, in
the custody of police.
1.2 Searching Officer: For the purposes of this policy, references to ‘searching officer’
refers to the person who will undertake or be present during the search of the detained
person which may (as legally applicable) be a police officer or member of designated
police staff. Where this policy refers to a searching officer, this includes all the officers
and staff involved in or present during that search.
1.3 Biological Sex: The sex assigned at birth (male or female).
1.4 Lived Gender: The gender by which someone lives and identifies.
1.5 More Thorough Search (MTS): A search involving the removal of more than jacket,
outer coat, and gloves, but not revealing intimate parts of the body. The searching officer
must be the same biological sex as the person being searched, unless only headwear of
footwear is removed*.
1.6 Exposure of Intimate Parts (EIP): A search involving the removal of more than
jacket, outer coat, and gloves, which exposes intimate parts of the body. The searching
officer must be the same biological sex as the person being searched*.
1.7 Strip Search: A search authorised by a Custody Sergeant involving the removal of
more than outer clothing. In this Code, outer clothing includes shoes and socks. The
searching officer must be the same biological sex as the person being searched*.
1.8 Intimate Search: A search which consists of the physical examination of a person’s
body orifices other than the mouth. The search is conducted by a registered medical
practitioner (unless in exceptional circumstances). Where the intimate search is
conducted by a police searching officer or a police searching officer is present, they must
be the same biological sex as the person being searched*.
*the only exceptions to this are through consensual searches (see section 4)

2. General Principles
2.1 MTS / EIP / strip / intimate searches** must be conducted by a searching officer of
the same biological sex as the detained person.
2.2 This applies regardless of the gender identity of either the detained person or the
searching officer.
2.3 There may only be exceptions to the general principles through consensual searches
(see section 4).
2.4 All existing safeguarding procedures must be followed when searching children,
young people, or vulnerable adults, including the presence of an appropriate adult where
required.
**subject to the exceptions described in section 1 around headwear, footwear and socks

3. Determining Biological Sex
3.1 Prior to the commencement of an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search, the detained
person must be asked to state their biological sex for the purpose of determining the
appropriate searching officer under statutory powers.
3.2 If there is uncertainty about the detained person’s biological sex, or if their stated sex
does not align with their biological sex, the searching officer must clarify the person’s
biological sex using available information. This must be objective factual information;
NICHE nominal research must be included.
3.3 In the absence of further information, the searching officer must conduct the search
based on their assessment of the detained person’s biological sex for the purposes of a
statutory search. This must take into account the stated biological sex of the detained
person and where this stated biological sex is not believed and acted on, there must be
clear, objective and documented rationale to justify this. However, see section 4
(consensual searches).
3.4 If, during the search, new information comes to light indicating the detained person’s
biological sex differs from the initial assessment, the searching officer must stop that
search. The rest of the search must be carried out based on the new assessment of the
detained person’s biological sex for the purposes of the statutory search.
3.5 For strip / intimate searches the custody officer holds responsibility for establishing
the biological sex of the detained person for the purposes of a statutory search and/or
whether a consensual search may be conducted in accordance with this policy.
3.6 For all other searches, the searching officer will be responsible for making this
determination and for recording the same, subject to written authorisation of an Inspector
in Surrey and Chief Inspector in Sussex.

4. Consensual Searches
4.1 In the case of an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search, a detained person may request
to be searched by a searching officer of their lived gender where this is different to their
biological sex. This must be subject to consent as set out in paragraph 4.2. If there is any
doubt that the lived gender of a detained person is the same as their biological sex, they
must be asked their preference concerning the biological sex of the searching officer who
will conduct the MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search. If the detained person is unwilling to
express a preference, a consensual search cannot be undertaken, and they will be
searched by an officer of the same biological sex under statutory powers.
4.2 If a detained person is to be searched by or in the presence of a searching officer
whose biological sex is not the same as the biological sex of the person to be searched,
this may only take place as a consensual search and requires:
• A clear request from the detained person.
• Voluntary agreement by the searching officer.
• Written authorisation by:
• Custody Sergeant for all strip searches in both Forces.
• Inspector for all intimate searches in both Forces.
For all other searches (MTS and/or EIP):
• An Inspector in Surrey,
• An Inspector for MTS searches and a Chief Inspector for EIP searches in Sussex,
• Fully informed written consent of all parties to be recorded on a Consensual Search
Form 2025. The Consent Form can also be found on NICHE for Custody and is also
available via Quickforms on a Mobile Terminal Device (MDT).
4.3 A detained person can also request one part of their body to be searched by a
searching officer of one biological sex and the other part of their body to be searched by
a searching officer of a different biological sex, depending on anatomical presentation
and lived gender. For the part of the search involving a searching officer of the opposite
biological sex to the person who is to be searched, this may only take place under these
consensual search arrangements.
4.4 If an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search in line with the lived gender cannot be
facilitated in a reasonable timeframe, the search will be undertaken by a searching officer
of the same biological sex, in accordance with statutory powers.
4.5 What is considered reasonable will depend on factors such as the risk of waiting, the
impact of any delay, Force demand and capacity, risks to the individual, resilience and
operational viability.
4.6 If the searching officer is unable to establish the biological sex of a detained person
despite reasonable efforts (e.g. due to intoxication or mental health), but an immediate
search is necessary and proportionate, the search will proceed under statutory powers
based on the biological sex of the individual as determined under section 3 of this policy.
4.7 If it is appropriate to wait, the detained person may be placed on constant
observations until the search can be carried out or alternative arrangements are made.
4.8 A consensual search will be undertaken in line with the provisions of PACE, with the
exception of the biological sex of the searching officer.
4.9 If consent is withdrawn at any time, the search will cease and be undertaken in line
with paragraph 2.1.
4.10 Use of the Consensual Search Form 2025 is mandatory for searches undertaken as
detailed in section 4.

5. Searching Officers
5.1 No searching officer can be ordered to carry out an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search
on any person.
5.2 There may be many reasons why searching officers may not want to carry out such
searches, including for example, prior trauma, medical conditions, gender fluidity, and
transgender status.
5.3 Any searching officer can decline to carry out such a search without providing

a reason. Furthermore, they should not be asked to provide a reason.
5.4 There will be no career detriment to a searching officer who declines to carry out
such a search.
5.5 The searching officer should in no way be questioned further about their decision and
an alternative searching officer should be identified without delay.

6. Recording and Justification
6.1 All decisions, including consents (or lack of), and risk-based justifications, must be
clearly documented on the most appropriate record (e.g. stop and search form, consent
form and custody record as relevant).

7. Transparency and Public Expectations

`
7.1 Individuals can expect that:
• They will be treated with dignity and respect.
• They can request a search be conducted by someone who reflects their lived gender.
• Their request for a consensual search will be considered and facilitated wherever
possible.
• If their request cannot be accommodated, they will be informed of the reasons why.
• Their preferences, consent, and the outcome will be recorded in writing.
• Searches will always be carried out lawfully, with their rights and welfare in mind.
Owner: Criminal Justice and Transformation

Analysis and Synthesis

In this section, we will critically appraise the policy which is currently in force in Sussex. To our knowledge there was no consultation with any people with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment in its making. This, on its own, especially considering the nature of the policy is deeply concerning. It does, however, cleanly reflect gender-critical ideology.

Language, Law and Context

From here, we will unpick the policy, piece by piece. We will start with the opening sentence:

“This policy provides operational guidance for officers and designated police staff when conducting searches where either the searching officer or detained person is transgender”

Problems with this sentence:

Who decides who is “transgender”?

1. The policy doesn’t define the threshold.
2. Is it based on self-identification? Appearance? Police records? Someone else’s assumption?
3. In practice, this opens the door to officers deciding who is “transgender”, which is arbitrary and unsafe.
4. Officers deciding who is “transgender” undermines legal certainty and risks discrimination.
5. “Transgender” is not a statutory category under PACE or the Equality Act
6. What does “transgender” mean in this context?
   • The policy uses the word but never defines it in law.
   • The Equality Act 2010 protects people with the characteristic of “gender reassignment,” but “transgender” isn’t a statutory category.
   • That means the whole framework is legally fuzzy from the start: “transgender” could include anyone the police perceiveas such.
7. What if you don’t identify as transgender?
   • If you identify simply as a woman – or, as a human, this policy can still force you into the “transgender” box for operational purposes.
   • It is both dehumanising, and replaces it with a bureaucratic label not of the persons choosing.
   • It assumes that “transgender” is an objective status that Police can assign.
   • It defines people as a “special case” that needs “management”

“1. Introduction 1.1 This policy provides operational searching guidance in relation to biological sex for police officers and designated police staff.”

What is “biological sex”?

Biology vs law:
In science, “biological sex” can refer to chromosomes, gonads, genitalia, hormones, secondary sex characteristics… none of which line up perfectly. Even the British Medical Association has said “biological sex” is not a single fixed category.

Law:

1. The Equality Act 2010 (EqA) originally referred only to “sex,” which until recently was interpreted as legal sex (your sex as recorded on your birth certificate or amended with a Gender Recognition Certificate).
2. The Supreme Court judgment in For Women Scotland (2025) narrowed “sex” for the purposes of the Equality Act alone to mean “biological sex” at birth.
3. But crucially: that ruling said this interpretation applied to the EqA’s framework, not to every other law or operational context.

PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984):

1. PACE Code C/D requires a “same sex” officer for strip searches, but does not define sex as biological sex.
2. Historically, “sex” in PACE has been interpreted as the person’s legal sex — which, if you hold a Gender Recognition Certificate, would mean your “lived gender” in law.

What the policy is doing

The Sussex/Surrey policy is importing the Supreme Court’s Equality Act definition (“biological sex”) into searching powers under PACE, even though that wasn’t what the judgment required.

There is no explicit statutory basis saying PACE searches must be based on “biological sex.”

They’re stretching a narrow ruling into a blanket operational rule, without Parliament ever deciding that.

Why that’s a problem

• It treats “biological sex” as a settled legal category when it isn’t. Outside the Equality Act, the law hasn’t redefined sex.
• By extending the Supreme Court’s wording into police procedure, the policy effectively rewrites how PACE is applied without a necessary change in legislation.
• This leap allows them to say: “we’re just following the law,” when in fact it is a discretionary policy choice.

The use of ‘biological sex’ in this policy has no legislative basis under PACE; it is an inappropriate extrapolation from a Supreme Court ruling limited to the Equality Act. Importing “biological sex” into PACE searches has no statutory basis. Policy exceeds legal authority by extending a definition beyond its intended scope.

“1.2 While the operational guidance is based on legal definitions related to biological sex, this policy applies to all individuals, including those who identify with genders that differ from their biological sex, for example, transgender, gender fluid, and non-binary people.”

Strip searches are among the most intrusive state actions and they demand the highest standard of clarity and protection. Reducing, for example trans women’s womanhood to subjective identification undermines objectivity, when in fact transition is embodied and recognisable in primary/secondary sex characteristics.

Policies must rely on objective criteria, not discretionary judgments that vary officer to officer.

It substitutes an objective legal framework (PACE’s requirement for “same sex” searches, historically interpreted as legal sex) with a subjective formulation (“identifies as”).

For a coercive power like strip-searching, there must be legal certainty and objectivity. Policies must not rely on discretionary interpretation by individual officers. Ambiguity at this level undermines human rights protections and creates space for discriminatory application.

It misrepresents the Equality Act, which protects people on the basis of gender reassignment, not “identifying as.” Subjective terminology creates ambiguity in a coercive context where clarity is required.

“1.3 This policy applies to all searches where, in law, the searching officer must be the same sex as the person being searched”

PACE requires “same sex” searches. Historically, “sex” = legal sex, including where a Gender Recognition Certificate is held. This interpretation provided objectivity and predictability.

The Surrey/Sussex policy substitutes “biological sex”: a contested construct only defined in the Equality Act (per the For Women Scotland ruling). There is no statutory authority for importing “biological sex” into PACE.

By conflating “sex” and “biological sex,” the policy creates ambiguity where legal certainty is required. This undermines the safeguarding purpose of the “same sex” requirement (i.e. ensuring people with breasts/vaginas are not strip-searched by men).

This substitution is arguably ultra vires (beyond powers), because the police are applying an Equality Act definition to PACE without legislative mandate. This could form a basis for challenge in judicial review.

“This policy reflects the ruling for the Supreme Court Judgment in the case of For Women Scotland Ltd (Appellant) v The Scottish Ministers [2025] which stated that under the Equality Act 2010 the term ‘sex’ means ‘biological sex’. This policy follows extensive legal advice.”

The For Women Scotland ruling was confined to interpretation of the Equality Act 2010. It did not redefine “sex” across all legislation, and certainly not in PACE. By extending that judgment into police procedure, the policy misrepresents the Court’s scope.

“Extensive legal advice” cannot substitute for statutory authority. This is a misapplication of case law: the Supreme Court decision is being used outside its legal domain, and so Sussex Police are exceeding their powers by reinterpreting PACE on the basis of unrelated Equality Act litigation.

Reliance on “legal advice” does not cure the defect: advice does not create law. The For Women Scotland case has no direct bearing on strip-search powers.

“1.5 It ensures compliance with:

• The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984,

• The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),in particular Articles 3 and 8, and

• The Equality Act 2010”

This paragraph claims compliance with PACE, ECHR, and EqA, but in reality it contradicts all three. This kind of overreach (claim vs practice) is precisely what courts and oversight bodies scrutinise.

PACE Requires “same sex” searches, historically based on legal sex. Substituting “biological sex” is not provided for in statute and undermines the safeguarding purpose.

1. ECHR Articles 3 & 8: Strip-searching a person with female anatomy by male officers, absent emergency necessity, is degrading treatment and violates bodily autonomy. Policy fails to guarantee protection; instead, it makes dignity conditional.
2. Equality Act 2010: The Act protects individuals undergoing gender reassignment. Treating them as their birth sex for searches is discriminatory.

The policy therefore redefines “sex” without legislative authority, conflicting with PACE safeguards, failing to meet Article 3 and 8 standards because dignity is not guaranteed equally to all: only to people Police do not deem to be “transgender”, which is neither observable, nor measurable.

By denying people who are percieved, or documented as not cisgender, it discriminates against both those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, and those thought to be transgender, but with no objective criteria.

“2.1 The procedures associated with this policy detail the process to be followed in relation to searching when considering biological sex for searches where, in law, the searching officer must be the same sex as the person being searched”

The policy is drafting procedures for a construct (“biological sex” under PACE) that does not exist in law.

1. It conflates the concept of “biological sex” as read into the Equality Act with PACE’s operational category of “same sex” — without statutory authority.
2. It ignores primary and secondary sex characteristics and medical changes (like HRT, surgeries, breast growth, genital reconstruction), which means its “biological sex” categorisation is not actually biological in the real, observable sense either.
3. This produces a policy that is both legally unsound and biologically incoherent.
4. There is no legal definition of “biological sex” in PACE. The policy is inventing a category.
5. Irrationality / Wednesbury unreasonableness: The policy purports to be based on “biological sex” but does not actually account for objective biological changes due to HRT or surgery. It applies a crude birth-assigned binary rather than actual physical reality.
6. Discrimination: By ignoring embodied biological changes of trans people, the policy denies them the safeguards it purports to apply based on “biology.”

So the policy claims to be about “biological sex,” but in practice it uses a term with no legal definition in this context, applies it inconsistently with actual biology, and thereby undermines the entire “same sex” safeguard it’s supposed to uphold.

“3.1 This policy will be reviewed in line with published timescales or by exception where there is an extraordinary event which requires update.”

“Extraordinary event” is a vague and arbitrary trigger. It’s not a legal or operational standard. Why should strip-search policy only be reviewed if something “extraordinary” happens? Safeguarding people’s dignity should require regular review or as required, especially when laws, case law, or oversight bodies evolve. This phrasing suggests they anticipate change only under crisis, not through normal accountability or stakeholder feedback.

This represents a failure of good governance: Policies affecting human rights (Articles 3 & 8) must be reviewed proactively and regularly, not just after extraordinary events. This wording could delay necessary updates in light of incremental legal changes or complaints, leaving people exposed to unlawful practices.

“1. Key Definitions

1. Detained Person: A person subject to a stop and search or having been arrested, in the custody of police.
2. 1.2 Searching Officer: For the purposes of this policy, references to ‘searching officer’ refers to the person who will undertake or be present during the search of the detained person which may (as legally applicable) be a police officer or member of designated police staff. Where this policy refers to a searching officer, this includes all the officers and staff involved in or present during that search”

These definitions are internally coherent, highlighting how sloppy the “sex/biological sex” definitions are by contrast, however we are concerned by “all the officers and staff present during that search”. As such, the definition is overly broad: “includes all officers and staff present” risks legitimising unnecessary or excessive numbers of people being present during intimate searches. Without restrictions, this could lead to degrading treatment (e.g. multiple staff watching without operational necessity). For someone who has not committed a crime but is detained on suspicion or association, this could amount to state-enabled sexual humiliation. Under Article 3 of the ECHR, excessive or unnecessary exposure of a detained person during strip/intimate searches constitutes degrading treatment. PACE Code C 11.4 requires that searches be conducted in a way that affords as much dignity as possible. Policy wording undermines this by making “presence” undefined. Policies should explicitly restrict presence to those necessary for safety or procedure, not the “whole station.” The definition of “searching officer” therefore must restrict presence to the minimum necessary staff. Otherwise, the policy enables degrading treatment through unnecessary spectatorship.

“1.3 Biological Sex: The sex assigned at birth (male or female)”

This is a direct factual inaccuracy in the policy. By equating “biological sex” with “sex assigned at birth,” the policy undermines its own premise. It is neither scientifically nor legally correct, leaving the definition open to challenge on grounds of irrationality and discrimination.

Biological sex is not reducible to “male or female”, variations in sex development (intersex conditions) exist and even within the binary, HRT and surgeries change secondary (and sometimes primary) sex characteristics, meaning “sex assigned at birth” is not an accurate descriptor of current biology. “Sex assigned at birth” is not a statutory definition under PACE or most UK law, and The Equality Act (per For Women Scotland) read “sex” as biological for that Act only, not “assigned at birth” and PACE has historically used legal sex, not birth assignment.

By defining “biological sex” as “sex assigned at birth,” the policy erases actual biology (e.g. breasts, genital reconstruction, HRT changes). It confuses a registrar’s entry at birth with a person’s present-day biology. This could be seen as irrational, because the policy claims to be about “biological sex” but actually defines it as an administrative category at birth, not biology. This intentionally erases both intersex people and trans people whose present biology differs from birth assignment.

“1.4 Lived Gender: The gender by which someone lives and identifies.”

This definition collapses social reality into a subjective self-identification again (“identifies”). It ignores the objective, external fact that people interact with someone based on what they perceive and recognise – because that’s what they see and experience. It leaves no space for someone who does not “identify” with a label but simply is perceived and treated as their sex/gender in the world. “Lived gender” under the Equality Act is a matter of social reality and transition, not simply “how someone identifies.” By defining “lived gender” as identification, the policy builds subjectivity into an area where only objective facts should govern coercive state action. People who are read and treated as a certain gender but do not “identify” with a label could be denied dignity under this policy.

This definition turns lived, observable, externally recognised gender into a subjective identity claim. It fails to account for people whose embodied presentation determines how they are treated: which is the actual safeguarding issue in searches. This creates an irrational policy basis and opens the door to discriminatory treatment.

“1.5 More Thorough Search (MTS): A search involving the removal of more than jacket, outer coat, and gloves, but not revealing intimate parts of the body. The searching officer must be the same biological sex as the person being searched, unless only headwear of footwear is removed*

Subnote *= “*the only exceptions to this are through consensual searches (see section 4)”

Strip-searches and “more thorough” searches are coercive state powers. That means the legal standard must be objective, predictable, and consistent. Ambiguity here creates opportunities for degrading treatment, particularly if “biological sex” is misapplied. As with earlier clauses, PACE requires “same sex,” not “same biological sex.” Substituting “biological sex” is ultra vires (beyond powers). A person with breasts and a vagina is objectively female in physical presentation. Defining eligibility based on “biological sex at birth” instead of observable reality could force degrading searches by male officers, despite the safeguarding purpose of the rule.

Consent should never be used to dilute fundamental safeguarding. By relegating dignity to an “exception,” the policy sets up a discriminatory structure: cis people get safeguarding automatically, suspected “trans” people only if they explicitly request and get approval. This is not equal treatment under Articles 3 & 8 ECHR.

MTS rules must follow PACE’s “same sex” standard, not a redefinition. It is degrading to subject people with female anatomy to male searches absent genuine necessity. Making dignity conditional on “consensual search” undermines universal rights, and creates a less favourable treatment for those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

By substituting “biological sex” for PACE’s “same sex,” and making dignity dependent on a “consensual exception,” the policy undermines safeguarding, discriminates against trans people, and exposes the force to Article 3/8 claims.

“1.6 Exposure of Intimate Parts (EIP): A search involving the removal of more than jacket, outer coat, and gloves, which exposes intimate parts of the body. The searching officer must be the same biological sex as the person being searched*.

1.7 Strip Search: A search authorised by a Custody Sergeant involving the removal of more than outer clothing. In this Code, outer clothing includes shoes and socks. The searching officer must be the same biological sex as the person being searched*.

1.8 Intimate Search: A search which consists of the physical examination of a person’s body orifices other than the mouth. The search is conducted by a registered medical practitioner (unless in exceptional circumstances). Where the intimate search is conducted by a police searching officer or a police searching officer is present, they must be the same biological sex as the person being searched*.”

These searches are among the most intrusive powers of the state. That means legal certainty is paramount (clear definitions, no ambiguity). Safeguarding must be absolute (dignity, privacy, protection from degrading treatment), and equality must be respected (no group gets dignity only conditionally).

These three provisions illustrate the core structural flaw: the policy uses a legally unsupported definition (“biological sex”), ignores objective physical reality, and conditions dignity on “consent.” At the highest levels of intrusion, this is not just unlawful but potentially constitutes degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR.

There is no statutory definition of “biological sex” under PACE; therefore the policy exceeds authority by substituting terms. Article 8 ECHR is breached because this undermines bodily autonomy and privacy by imposing birth-based categorisation over present reality. This creates a breach of the Equality Act, discriminatory in effect and less favourable treatment for those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

“2.1 MTS / EIP / strip / intimate searches must be conducted by a searching officer of the same biological sex as the detained person.
2.2 This applies regardless of the gender identity of either the detained person or the searching officer.
2.3 There may only be exceptions to the general principles through consensual searches (see section 4).
2.4 All existing safeguarding procedures must be followed when searching children, young people, or vulnerable adults, including the presence of an appropriate adult where required.”

Again, this replaces PACE’s “same sex” safeguard with an unsupported definition, leading to “Biological sex” (being defined earlier as “sex assigned at birth”) which ignores actual biology (HRT, surgery, secondary traits). This creates absurd outcomes: someone with breasts/vagina can be forced to be searched by male officers.

It explicitly states the lived/embodied reality of the detained person is irrelevant. This is discriminatory: cis women’s safeguarding is automatic; trans women’s is disregarded. For people with surgeries/hormonal changes, this is not just identity, it is objective physical reality which is being dismissed. Again, dignity is conditional: you only get safeguarding if you ask, and the officer agrees. This creates unequal treatment where people suspected of being “transgender” (which is entirely subjective and inappropriate) must negotiate.

The “safeguarding” notes are in legislative terms, completely inadequate and not in accordance with the detail of knowledge expected of anyone dealing with vulnerable people. Its wording does not explicitly prevent the same problems: a trans child, or vulnerable trans adult, could still be forced into opposite-sex searches under this policy.

PACE requires “same sex,” not “biological sex.” There is no statutory authority for substitution. It is degrading to subject a person with female anatomy to be searched by men. ECHR Article 3 is absolute. Section 2.2 explicitly discriminates against those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment by denying them the safeguarding cis people receive, and ignoring actual physical characteristics contradicts the purpose of the “same sex” safeguard. It openly disregards the lived and embodied reality of transitioned people, creating discriminatory and degrading treatment. It is vulnerable to direct challenge under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, PACE, and the Equality Act.

As we move from “MTS” to “intimate searches,” this principle entrenches abuse: the more invasive the procedure, the less relevant your actual anatomy is deemed to be. That inversion (ignoring physical reality at the highest levels of intrusion) makes the risk of Article 3 violations extreme.

“3. Determining Biological Sex

3.1 Prior to the commencement of an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search, the detained person must be asked to state their biological sex for the purpose of determining the appropriate searching officer under statutory powers”

Strip and intimate searches involve actual physical anatomy. The purpose of the “same sex” rule is to protect dignity by matching body with body. Forcing people to declare an abstract “biological sex” category undermines that safeguard.

Instead of acknowledging the physical body in front of them (breasts, genitalia, absence of male traits), officers are told to ask for a conceptual category (“biological sex”). This divorces the safeguard from the very thing it is supposed to protect – physical dignity.

Many people will not accept the framing of “biological sex,” especially those who do not “identify” as trans but live as their sex after physical transition. Forcing someone to “state their biological sex” when their body clearly reflects otherwise is an act of degradation in itself. It can re-traumatise and is unnecessary when anatomy is objectively visible. This discriminatory effect will mean that those not designated as “trans” by the Police are never asked to deny their bodies; while those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment are.

Clause 3.1 is not just discriminatory, it is potentially unlawful under the GRA 2004. It disregards legal sex recognition (s.9) and risks unlawful disclosure of gender history (s.22). It collides not only with privacy protections but could expose officers and forces to liability. The policy applies “biological sex” where Parliament has legislated for legal sex under the GRA. Demanding disclosure of gender history without lawful basis infringes the right to private life, and it is humiliating treatment to force disclosure against a person’s embodied reality.

Under section 9 of the Gender Recognition Act, a full Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) means your legal sex changes for all purposes, except specific narrow exemptions (like succession to peerages). It is a criminal offence to disclose someone’s “gender history” if you’ve learned it in an official capacity, unless an exception applies. It is an offence punishable by fine, and designed to protect privacy, dignity, and prevent humiliation.

This clause undermines dignity by making the safeguard about a conceptual declaration instead of the actual physical body. It is irrational, discriminatory, and demeaning — and therefore highly challengeable under Article 3 and 8 of the ECHR. In our Suggested Searching Procedures Policy, we envision a way forward in which such invasive questioning is unnecessary and irrelevant.

“3.2 If there is uncertainty about the detained person’s biological sex, or if their stated sex does not align with their biological sex, the searching officer must clarify the person’s biological sex using available information. This must be objective factual information; NICHE nominal research must be included.”

While the whole policy muddies “sex” into a conceptual category suddenly dropping in “objective factual information” as though it is consistent, is wildly ironic. It shifts decision-making power into the hands of officers, using “objective factual information”, but that’s undefined and prone to abuse, and risks institutionalising surveillance and humiliation. NICHE is a police case management / records system (used widely in UK forces). It stores personal details, criminal history, custody records, and sometimes “flags” on identity. Using NICHE means officers would be digging into records, not observing physical reality.

Whilst claiming to “objective factual information” however “biological sex” as “sex assigned at birth.” That is not objective biology, it’s a registrar’s note on a birth certificate. In reality, observable biology (breasts, genitalia, secondary traits) is ignored. Instead, “objective facts” are birth records or police system entries. This means if you say “I’m female” and an officer disagrees, they can override you by digging into databases. It transforms your existence into a bureaucratic entry to be verified or contradicted. That is both degrading and undignified.

Nothing in PACE authorises officers to determine “biological sex” through record checks. PACE requires respect for “same sex,” not investigative determination of birth assignment. For those with a GRC, using NICHE to override their legal sex risks unlawful disclosure (s.22 GRA).

Clause 3.2 creates a discriminatory override: if your body and life say one thing, officers can overrule you using databases. It pretends to be “objective” but in practice relies on birth assignment, not biology. This collides with GRA protections and ECHR Articles 3 & 8.

“3.3 In the absence of further information, the searching officer must conduct the search based on their assessment of the detained person’s biological sex for the purposes of a statutory search. This must take into account the stated biological sex of the detained person and where this stated biological sex is not believed and acted on, there must be clear, objective and documented rationale to justify this. However, see section 4 (consensual searches). “

Strip and intimate searches are coercive state actions. Decisions about who performs them must rest on objective, lawful criteria, not individual judgment. Allowing an officer to assess someone’s “biological sex” creates a serious risk of error, bias, and humiliation. “Assessment” is inherently subjective; adding “objective and documented rationale” doesn’t cure that. Officers are not medically qualified, and “biological sex” isn’t visually obvious in many cases (esp. after HRT/surgery).

If an officer disbelieves a person’s stated sex, they can override it — the detained person has no appeal mechanism in the moment. his invites discriminatory assumptions and stereotyping. Being told “I don’t believe you’re the sex you say you are” before an invasive search is degrading in itself.

PACE does not authorise officers to determine a person’s sex; it assumes the category is known (legal sex). It is humiliating and degrading to dispute a person’s status and conduct an opposite-sex search. It is arbitrary interference with private life; no lawful basis for discretionary override. It disregards legal sex and may compel disclosure of gender history.

Therefore clause 3.3 institutionalises subjective officer discretion over an individual’s body. It replaces lawful objectivity with personal judgment, breaching PACE, Articles 3 & 8 ECHR, and the GRA.

“3.4 If, during the search, new information comes to light indicating the detained person’s biological sex differs from the initial assessment, the searching officer must stop that search. The rest of the search must be carried out based on the new assessment of the detained person’s biological sex for the purposes of the statutory search.”

Searches, especially strip or intimate ones, must be governed by certainty and dignity from the outset. Changing “assessment” mid-search introduces chaos, confusion, and the risk of further humiliation. It is absurd operational logic, “new information” coming to light during a search?

Clause 3.4 is operationally irrational. It treats anatomy as “new information” and allows reclassification mid-search, causing humiliation, confusion, and trauma. It undermines dignity, violates Articles 3 and 8, and has no basis in PACE.

It institutionalises a moment of discovery where a trans woman’s body becomes grounds for revoking the original safeguard (female officer). This is preventable, if the right questions are asked potentially transforming a private medical fact into “new information,” triggering exposure, confusion, and potential ridicule. It treats, for example, genital configuration as the sole determinant of “biological sex,” ignoring breasts, hips, facial features, and every other marker.

This describes a policy which is designed to cause humiliation in real time – being partially unclothed, then halted and told “we need men now” is inherently degrading. Mid-search switches introduce chaos, extra personnel, and prolong exposure. They should be avoided.

PACE envisions the same “same-sex” officer throughout; it never contemplates swapping officers mid-procedure. A woman holding a GRC is legally female; treating genitalia as “new information” contravenes her legal sex and could amount to unlawful disclosure of gender history.

Under PACE, there is no power to reassign searchers mid-procedure. Clause 3.4 codifies a scenario where anatomy overrides both legal sex and embodied presentation, forcing a mid-search swap that is degrading, unsafe, and unlawful.

“3.5 For strip / intimate searches the custody officer holds responsibility for establishing the biological sex of the detained person for the purposes of a statutory search and/or whether a consensual search may be conducted in accordance with this policy”

Strip and intimate searches are the most invasive actions police can take. Whoever decides who conducts them must do so on clear, lawful, and objective criteria. Transferring that power to a custody officer without guidance turns a serious safeguarding duty into a guess based on bias, records, or stereotypes.

“Establishing biological sex” isn’t explained. Custody officers aren’t medical professionals; they’ll default to paper records or perception, neither of which reflects the present, embodied person. It ignores visible, physical markers (breasts, vagina, body fat distribution) that are biological, in favour of birth-assignment bureaucracy.

If the custody system lists “male,” they’re instructed to trust the record, not the person or their observable anatomy, that divorces “objectivity” from physical reality. Tying “consensual search” decisions to the same flawed determination compounds the problem: if the officer misclassifies someone, they may wrongly deny a consensual safeguard.

One officer now “establishes” an identity category that dictates who can touch the detainee’s body. That’s a huge discretionary power with no oversight or appeal mechanism.

No statutory authority for custody officers to “establish biological sex.” PACE assumes sex is a given (legal sex). Misclassification leading to opposite-sex search is degrading treatment & privacy breach. Section 3.5 of the policy claims objectivity but instructs decisions based on non-objective markers (birth record vs body), it is irrational. It hands custody officers unfettered discretion to “establish biological sex” without objective criteria, enabling arbitrary, degrading decisions that contradict physical reality, PACE, the GRA, and ECHR rights.

“3.6 For all other searches, the searching officer will be responsible for making this determination and for recording the same, subject to written authorisation of an Inspector in Surrey and Chief Inspector in Sussex.”

This spreads the same subjective classification power we’ve already criticised, giving frontline officers authority to decide someone’s “biological sex”, a concept the policy still hasn’t defined coherently, and merely requiring a senior signature. That doesn’t cure the unlawfulness; it just institutionalises it.

Clause 3.6 decentralises an unlawful practice. Giving officers discretionary power to classify a person’s “biological sex,” rubber-stamped by senior ranks, institutionalises subjectivity, discrimination, and humiliation – contrary to PACE, ECHR, and the GRA. There is no power for officers to determine sex; they must act on an objective legal basis. “Authorisation” cannot legitimise a process built on undefined criteria.

“4. Consensual Searches

4.1 In the case of an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search, a detained person may request to be searched by a searching officer of their lived gender where this is different to their biological sex. This must be subject to consent as set out in paragraph

4.2. If there is any doubt that the lived gender of a detained person is the same as their biological sex, they must be asked their preference concerning the biological sex of the searching officer who will conduct the MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search. If the detained person is unwilling to express a preference, a consensual search cannot be undertaken, and they will be searched by an officer of the same biological sex under statutory powers”

This section is one of the most revealing in the entire document. It pretends to offer dignity through “choice” but actually buries people suspected of being “trans” under procedural traps that make it impossible to claim. It offers “consent” in name only, loaded with impossible preconditions, undefined terms, and an implicit bias against anyone suspected of being “trans”.

“Lived gender” is an undefined term, and is meaningless. If a person identifies simply as human, and their biology and presentation are estrogen-dominant – where do they fit?

“If there is any doubt that the lived gender is the same as biological sex…” – Who decides what counts as “doubt”: doubt can’t be objectively measured. You must request and negotiate your dignity. If you’re too frightened, in shock, or don’t trust the process, you lose protection. You might want an officer who shares your body type or protected characteristic (gender reassignment), but that’s not offered – only “biological sex,”.

“If unwilling to express a preference… searched by officer of same biological sex.” This is it’s coerced compliance: silence = punishment. There is no room for reasonable and objective criteria to be applied, for example “I’d like someone who matches my anatomy and legal sex.”

There is no statutory basis for conditioning “same sex” safeguarding on discretionary consent. Forcing detainees to negotiate for dignity violates the absolute prohibition on degrading treatment. There is a privacy breach if officers demand disclosure of gender history to “prove” “lived gender”.

Clause 4.1 erects procedural barriers that deny trans people the very dignity the policy claims to offer. “Lived gender” is undefined, “doubt” is arbitrary, and silence is punished. It’s discriminatory, irrational, and incompatible with Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, PACE, and the GRA. Being interrogated about your “lived gender” (whatever this means) under suspicion, and forced to “state a preference” under threat of opposite-sex search, is degrading and traumatising.

“4.2 If a detained person is to be searched by or in the presence of a searching officer whose biological sex is not the same as the biological sex of the person to be searched, this may only take place as a consensual search and requires:

• A clear request from the detained person.

• Voluntary agreement by the searching officer.

• Written authorisation by:

• Custody Sergeant for all strip searches in both Forces.

• Inspector for all intimate searches in both Forces. For all other searches (MTS and/or EIP):

• An Inspector in Surrey,

• An Inspector for MTS searches and a Chief Inspector for EIP searches in Sussex,

• Fully informed written consent of all parties to be recorded on a Consensual Search Form 2025. The Consent Form can also be found on NICHE for Custody and is also available via Quickforms on a Mobile Terminal Device (MDT).”

Instead of ensuring everyone can be searched with dignity, the clause discourages officers from granting and detainees from requesting a respectful option. Safeguarding becomes a privilege, not a right. It creates a Bureaucratic deterrent: Multiple sign-offs (custody sergeant, inspector, chief inspector) + a special form on NICHE/MDT. Each extra step delays or blocks humane treatment; frontline officers will default to “statutory powers” to save time. The result of which is likely to mean that almost no consensual searches occur.

Detainee must request; officer must agree; senior ranks must approve. Every stage adds another veto point. Safeguarding therefore depends on goodwill, not entitlement.

Recording “biological sex not the same” on a Consensual Search Form 2025 effectively discloses gender history—potential GRA s.22 breach. Mid-custody hierarchy differences (Surrey = Inspector; Sussex = Chief Inspector) will create postcode-lottery rights.

Clause 4.2 weaponises bureaucracy. By layering consents and authorisations, it deters officers from granting, and detainees from seeking, humane treatment—contrary to PACE, the Equality Act, the GRA, and Articles 3 & 8 ECHR. Having to petition multiple ranks, sign special forms, and watch your history documented just to be searched respectfully is designed to be humiliating.

“4.3 A detained person can also request one part of their body to be searched by a searching officer of one biological sex and the other part of their body to be searched by a searching officer of a different biological sex, depending on anatomical presentation and lived gender. For the part of the search involving a searching officer of the opposite biological sex to the person who is to be searched, this may only take place under these consensual search arrangements.”

This clause admits, at last, that anatomical presentation matters: breasts, genitals, physical features, yet still insists on filtering every humane accommodation through bureaucratic consent hoops. It’s a grudging nod to reality wrapped in red tape. Clause 4.3 exposes the policy’s internal contradiction: it acknowledges anatomical presentation yet subordinates it to “biological sex” and excessive bureaucracy. It’s an admission that objective anatomy is the correct standard, and a failure to apply it.

It adds unnecessary procedural barriers to a safeguard that should be automatic. It is degrading to make respect for anatomy conditional on paperwork.

The phrase “depending on anatomical presentation” shows they know physical characteristics are the relevant factor, but instead of building the whole policy around anatomy, they treat it as an exception. Even here, they frame each part of the search around “biological sex” instead of observable anatomy. That keeps the decision tethered to birth assignment, not current physical form. The more nuanced and reasonable the request (e.g., matching searcher by anatomy), the more paperwork is required, discouraging compliance. Officers have no guidance on how to interpret “anatomical presentation.” Some may handle it respectfully; others may use it as justification to escalate exposure (“prove it”). This clause could have been the foundation of an objective, anatomy-based safeguard – a simple, humane rule: “Each part searched by an officer sharing that anatomy.”

It adds unnecessary procedural barriers to a safeguard that should be automatic, is degrading to make respect for anatomy conditional on paperwork. Those designated as not “transgender” never face anatomy-based authorisation. It underlines that the policy recognises anatomy’s relevance yet refuses to operationalise it objectively.

“4.4 If an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search in line with the lived gender cannot be facilitated in a reasonable timeframe, the search will be undertaken by a searching officer of the same biological sex, in accordance with statutory powers.

4.5 What is considered reasonable will depend on factors such as the risk of waiting, the impact of any delay, Force demand and capacity, risks to the individual, resilience and operational viability.”

Clause 4.4/4.5 transforms human-rights compliance into a schedule-dependent privilege. “Reasonable timeframe” is an abuse loophole: it legitimises opposite-sex searches when staff are busy, breaching Articles 3 & 8, PACE, and the Equality Act. By defining “reasonableness” through operational pressures, the policy reframes fundamental rights as contingent on workload. This is the clearest textual evidence that the clause’s purpose is administrative convenience, not safeguarding. Clause 4.5 institutionalises “rights unless we’re busy” logic. It substitutes human-rights standards with resource-management criteria, making degradation lawful by convenience. It is incompatible with Articles 3 & 8 ECHR and irrational under PACE.

Time-pressure should never justify degrading treatment. Articles 3 and 8 ECHR place absolute obligations on the state: once the potential for humiliation or sexual intrusion exists, convenience cannot outweigh dignity. “Reasonable timeframe” is undefined, it could mean minutes, giving officers total discretion to decide when dignity becomes “inconvenient.” This converts a human-rights safeguard into an operational option.

If it’s easier or faster to use a “same biological sex” officer (often male), forces will prioritise speed over safeguarding, therefore administrative delay becomes a pretext for abuse. Only suspected trans or gender-nonconforming people lose protection when staff are short. Article 3 of the ECHR is absolute with no exceptions for practicality. Article 8 requires interference with bodily autonomy to be necessary and proportionate; “we were busy” is neither. “Statutory powers” (PACE) don’t include an emergency override based on delay. This clause invents one, exceeding authority (ultra vires). Furthermore, it contradicts the policy’s own stated safeguarding purpose.

“Force demand,” “capacity,” “resilience,” “operational viability” – these describe the organisation’s comfort, not the detainee’s dignity. There’s no mention of psychological harm, humiliation, or trauma: the actual human-rights tests. In any complaint, officers can point to workload or capacity as a catch-all justification: effectively a legal shield for abuse.

Safeguarding cannot be conditional on convenience. If a suitable officer isn’t immediately available, the search must be delayed or conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, and never by an officer with opposite-sex anatomy. Where immediate safeguarding cannot be met, the search should be delayed or adapted to ensure dignity is preserved. Operational demand should never justify derogation from human-rights standards.

4.6 If the searching officer is unable to establish the biological sex of a detained person despite reasonable efforts (e.g. due to intoxication or mental health), but an immediate search is necessary and proportionate, the search will proceed under statutory powers based on the biological sex of the individual as determined under section 3 of this policy”

This clause authorises searches based on guesswork – not anatomy, not legal sex, not objective fact. It’s the moment where “biological sex” reveals itself as a euphemism for “whatever the officer decides”. “Unable to establish biological sex” means in reality, they can’t access a database or make a quick assumption. But the person’s visible anatomy is right there; if the purpose is dignity, that’s the only relevant information, yet they’re told to default to the concept of biological sex (defined as birth assignment) rather than the reality in front of them.

“Necessary and proportionate” comes from ECHR language, but this context fails both tests: Necessary? Only if immediate harm would result from waiting (rare). Proportionate? Never, if the cost is degrading treatment. It borrows from human-rights vocabulary to excuse violations of those very rights.

Furthermore, it assumes trans and gender-diverse people are “unclear cases.” We contest this (see our suggested guidance). Mental health or intoxication does not voids one’s right to dignity that is a safeguarding inversion. Section 3 relies on “objective factual information” (records, NICHE). If that fails, they revert to a subjective belief, so the fallback for “objective uncertainty” is subjective assertion which is an operational oxymoron.

In PACE, there is no authority to guess sex; legal and objective criteria must be followed. It is humiliating to be misclassified and stripped by on officer who does not share the same phenotype and primary and secondary sexual characteristics. There is no lawful basis for “assumed sex.” It admits uncertainty yet instructs officers to act as if certainty exists.

Clause 4.6 codifies search by assumption. When officers “can’t tell,” they are told to pretend they can, defaulting to “birth assignment” and ignoring the actual body. It’s irrational, degrading, and incompatible with PACE and Articles 3 & 8. It allows misgendering and searches by officers with “opposite” anatomy whenever officers claim uncertainty, effectively rewarding ignorance.

“4.7 If it is appropriate to wait, the detained person may be placed on constant observations until the search can be carried out or alternative arrangements are made.”

Clause 4.7 replaces one unlawful act (opposite-sex search) with another (constant surveillance). It weaponises “waiting” into voyeuristic custody, violating Articles 3 & 8 and failing PACE’s dignity mandate.

When the state can’t meet its duty to perform a lawful, dignified search, the solution should be delay with comfort and privacy, not intensified surveillance. “Constant observations” may compound humiliation, especially for trans people whose bodies are already treated as suspect. Who decides appropriateness? If an officer already sees you as “unclear,” they might deem waiting “appropriate” and place you under watch indefinitely.

In custody policy, this often means visual monitoring at all times, sometimes with clothing removal to prevent self-harm. For a detainee designated as “trans”, that’s extended exposure and supervision which is another form of degrading treatment.

Continuous observation in partial undress or without need is degrading treatment under article 3 of the ECHR. Intrusion on privacy is not “necessary in a democratic society.” There is no statutory basis for surveillance as substitute for lawful search; it undermines the requirement of minimal intrusion. It has a disproportionate impact on those with protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

“Observation” doesn’t solve the problem (lack of lawful searcher); it creates a new rights breach.

“4.8 A consensual search will be undertaken in line with the provisions of PACE, with the exception of the biological sex of the searching officer.”

Clause 4.8 openly admits it departs from PACE. You can’t be “in line” with a statute while deleting its key safeguard. Consent under duress doesn’t legalise an otherwise unlawful search.

PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C Annex A, and Code A) is crystal clear:

“The search shall be carried out by an officer of the same sex as the detainee.”

That’s not a decorative phrase, it’s a statutory safeguard against humiliation. This clause explicitly removes that safeguard and replaces it with “consent,” which in a custody setting is rarely meaningful. PACE doesn’t permit exceptions to the “same sex” rule; this policy invents one. Saying “in line with PACE except X” means “not in line with PACE.”

Consent given in detention is not freely given: you’re under authority, often frightened. PACE safeguards exist precisely because “consent” isn’t reliable under duress. PACE refers to sex, not “biological sex.” The policy substitutes a contested term that’s narrower and more discriminatory. This clause effectively rewrites PACE to align with gender-critical ideology, not legislation.

Police can’t “except” themselves from statute by internal policy.

If a consensual search departs from PACE’s same-sex rule, it must:

• be requested in writing by the detainee,
• be reviewed by a safeguarding officer, and
• never override legal sex or anatomy-based dignity.

But ideally, no exception is needed PACE’s same-sex principle should be honoured using objective anatomy or legal sex.

“4.9 If consent is withdrawn at any time, the search will cease and be undertaken in line with paragraph 2.1.”

Clause 4.9 weaponises withdrawal: it nullifies voluntariness by attaching punishment to refusal. Consent without the freedom to revoke is no consent at all.

What this really means is that withdrawing consent doesn’t stop the search; it just converts it into a forced search under the ‘biological-sex’ rule. In the case of people who have changed their sex characteristics, and therefore have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment: usually by an officer with opposite-sex anatomy.

True consent includes the right to stop without penalty, here, exercising that right triggers the very harm the detainee feared: a coerced search. The detainee’s options are to comply with humiliating paperwork or face a degrading statutory search. That’s not consent; that’s duress. Punishing withdrawal with an opposite-sex search is degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR) and a privacy breach (Article 8 ECHR). PACE provides a fixed safeguard (same-sex officer). You can’t “default” to a version that reintroduces harm once consent fails.

“4.10 Use of the Consensual Search Form 2025 is mandatory for searches undertaken as detailed in section 4.”

Clause 4.10 converts a human-rights safeguard into a data-trail of stigma. Recording “sex mismatch” is unnecessary, discriminatory, and legally hazardous

Every “consensual” search generates a formal record noting that the officer’s “biological sex” differs from the detainee’s, effectively outing trans detainees inside police systems (NICHE / MDT). The form itself documents a mismatch between legal and “biological” sex, personal data revealing gender history.

There isno lawful basis under UK GDPR Art 6(1) or Art 9(2) for processing sensitive data to facilitate an unlawful search. It creates a permanent digital flag marking the detainee as “exceptional,” enabling future discrimination. Officers will avoid the extra form; detainees may avoid requesting dignity to prevent data capture.

Under PACE, coerced “fallback” search & extra paperwork is not authorised. Withdrawal results in degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR), forced disclosure violates article 3. This would result in less favourable treatment under the Equality Act (2010), unlawful disclosure under S22 of the GRA (2004), and violate GDPR legislation.

“5. Searching Officers
5.1 No searching officer can be ordered to carry out an MTS / EIP / strip / intimate search
on any person.
5.2 There may be many reasons why searching officers may not want to carry out such
searches, including for example, prior trauma, medical conditions, gender fluidity, and
transgender status.
5.3 Any searching officer can decline to carry out such a search without providing a reason. Furthermore, they should not be asked to provide a reason.
5.4 There will be no career detriment to a searching officer who declines to carry out
such a search.
5.5 The searching officer should in no way be questioned further about their decision and
an alternative searching officer should be identified without delay.”

Section 5 constructs asymmetric empathy: officers’ feelings are safeguarded; detainees’ trauma is institutionalised. By omitting trauma-informed safeguards for trans people—whose risk profile is well-evidenced—the policy breaches Articles 3 & 8 ECHR, PSED duties, and fundamental safeguarding ethics.

Safeguarding here operates upwards: protecting the officer from emotional unease while offering nothing to the person being exposed. The clause imagines only one type of fragility: cisgender or institutional discomfort.

For detainess classified as “trans”, half of whom have statistically experienced sexual violence, this silence is devastating. Research shows that ≈50 % of trans respondents report sexual violence. High stress, power imbalance and loss of control result in potent trauma triggers. Physical exposure by distrusted officers might induce flashbacks, dissociation, autonomic panic.

Here we can see that officers receive unconditional opt-outs, while detainees get conditional dignity at best. There is no mention of trauma-informed practice, de-escalation, or consent reaffirmation. Policies neutral on face disadvantage a group with known heightened risk. Therefore, ignoring foreseeable psychological harm in an invasive procedure could be regarded as degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR), and failure to have due regard to needs of people with protected characteristic of gender reassignment fails Public Sector Equality Duty (EqA s.149).

Safeguarding within search procedures must protect every individual involved, recognising that vulnerability can manifest differently for detainees and officers. While operational guidance must respect officers’ wellbeing, heightened consideration is required for detainees belonging to groups with elevated risk of trauma or sexual violence, including those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

Policies and practices should therefore be:

• Trauma-informed, acknowledging the prevalence of prior abuse and its potential to trigger acute distress during searches;
• Anatomy-respectful, aligning search procedures with the individual’s present physical characteristics to preserve dignity;
• Autonomy-centred, ensuring participation, explanation, and the right to pause or withdraw without penalty.

Safeguarding must never privilege institutional comfort over individual dignity.

“6. Recording and Justification 6.1 All decisions, including consents (or lack of), and risk-based justifications, must be clearly documented on the most appropriate record (e.g. stop and search form, consent form and custody record as relevant).”

While this Creates a paper trail, encourages officers to articulate reasoning and supports audit and oversight, earlier clauses rely on belief, doubt, or operational convenience, this “record” may simply memorialise subjective impressions (e.g. “officer doubted lived gender”) rather than objective, lawful criteria.

PACE & ECHR compliance should mean that documentation reflects evidence, not instinct. This enables meaningful review: auditors can test facts, not feelings. Equality duty prevents codifying bias into official records.

“7. Individuals can expect that:
• They will be treated with dignity and respect.
• They can request a search be conducted by someone who reflects their lived gender.
• Their request for a consensual search will be considered and facilitated wherever possible.
• If their request cannot be accommodated, they will be informed of the reasons why.
• Their preferences, consent, and the outcome will be recorded in writing.
• Searches will always be carried out lawfully, with their rights and welfare in mind.”

Section 7 is performative reassurance. It describes the policy as if it complied with law, while the text itself documents multiple ECHR, PACE, and Equality Act breaches. The result is a misleading public statement amounting to institutional gaslighting.

Earlier clauses remove objective dignity (Sections 3–4) and make humane treatment conditional on paperwork. Saying you can request dignity implies the default is denial. PACE provides an entitlement, not a favour.

Operational convenience (4.4 – 4.5) already defines “possible” so narrowly that requests fail by design. It offers explanation, not remedy. You’re told why you’ll be humiliated, not protected from it.

The clause asserts legality while every major safeguard (same-sex search, trauma consideration, Article 3 compliance) has been eroded. The repetition of “lawful” doesn’t make an unlawful act lawful.

Summary of Criticisms: “Searching Biological Sex Policy (1248/2025)” – Surrey and Sussex Police

This policy, while presented as operational guidance, represents a systemic departure from established law, safeguarding principles, and human rights obligations. It replaces objective standards with subjective discretion, erodes autonomy under the guise of consent, and institutionalises discrimination against suspected trans and gender-diverse people.

It undermines autonomy by converting consent into coercion, and undermines anatomy by privileging ideology over objective physical reality.

It transforms a rights-based safeguard into an operational instrument of discrimination, embedding humiliation within procedure and calling it compliance.

1. Conceptual and Legal Foundations

Undefined and Unlawful Terminology

1. The policy introduces “biological sex” as a decisive category without defining it in law or referencing any statutory authority.
2. The Equality Act 2010 constrains “biological sex” to the context of anti-discrimination; it is not a lawful or operational basis for searches under PACE.
3. Substituting sex (PACE terminology) with biological sex is ultra vires and beyond the powers conferred by statute.

Conflation of Constructs

1. The document conflates sex, biological sex, lived gender, and gender identity, producing internal contradictions and operational confusion.
2. Decisions hinge on subjective interpretation rather than objective, recordable facts (e.g. observable anatomy, legal sex).

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2. Autonomy Undermined

Consent as Coercion

1. “Consensual searches” require multi-tier authorisation and paperwork (Clause 4.2), transforming a right to dignity into an administrative privilege.
2. Withdrawing consent (Clause 4.9) triggers punishment — a forced search under the “biological sex” rule — invalidating voluntariness.

Procedural Traps

1. Detainees must request humane treatment and negotiate through uncertainty (“lived gender,” “doubt”), while cis detainees receive automatic safeguards.
2. The policy uses consent language to mask compulsion and shift blame to detainees for their own degradation.

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3. Anatomy Undermined

Disregard for Physical Reality

1. Officers are instructed to ignore observable anatomy in favour of assumed birth assignment.
2. Even where anatomy is acknowledged (Clause 4.3), it is subordinated to bureaucracy, not used as the primary objective criterion.

Operational Irrationality

1. Clauses allow mid-search reclassification (Clause 3.4) — halting procedures to swap officers upon discovering anatomy inconsistent with expectation.
2. This codifies humiliation and violates PACE, which requires consistent safeguarding throughout.

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4. Abuse by Convenience

“Reasonable Timeframe” Loopholes

1. Clauses 4.4–4.5 allow opposite-sex searches when staff or time are scarce.
2. Factors like “force demand” and “operational viability” are irrelevant under Article 3 ECHR, which admits no exception for convenience.

Delay as Detention

1. “Constant observation” (Clause 4.7) weaponises waiting into surveillance, subjecting detainees to prolonged exposure rather than dignified delay.

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5. Safeguarding Failures

Asymmetric Empathy

1. Officers may refuse searches for personal reasons; detainees’ trauma – especially among trans people (~50% experience sexual violence) is unacknowledged.
2. No trauma-informed provisions; no recognition of heightened vulnerability during exposure or searches.

Inversion of Duty

1. Instead of protecting vulnerable detainees, the policy protects institutional comfort.
2. Contradicts the Public Sector Equality Duty (Equality Act 2010, s.149) to have due regard to the needs of protected groups.

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6. Record-Keeping as Bias Ledger

1. Clause 6.1’s recording requirement lacks an objectivity clause, meaning subjective beliefs (e.g. “officer doubted lived gender”) are treated as factual records.
2. “Consensual Search Forms” (Clause 4.10) create a permanent data trail revealing gender history, risking GRA s.22 breaches and GDPR violations.

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7. Transparency as Gaslighting

1. Section 7 promises “dignity, lawfulness, and respect,” yet every safeguard is conditional, reversible, or bureaucratically denied.
2. It reassures where it should remedy, asserting legality while codifying breaches of:
   • PACE (same-sex safeguard),
   • Article 3 ECHR (degrading treatment),
   • Article 8 ECHR (privacy and bodily autonomy),
   • Equality Act 2010 (less favourable treatment), and
   • Gender Recognition Act 2004 (legal sex override; s.22 disclosure).

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8. Summary of Legal Vulnerabilities

Category	Breach
Ultra Vires (PACE)	Substitutes “biological sex” for legal sex; creates consent exceptions not in statute
Article 3 ECHR	Normalises degrading treatment; punishment for withdrawal
Article 8 ECHR	Compelled disclosure, arbitrary interference with privacy
Equality Act 2010	Indirect discrimination; failure of PSED
GRA 2004	Ignores legal sex; risks unlawful disclosure (s.22)
Data Protection (UK GDPR)	Unlawful processing of special category data
Irrationality / Wednesbury Unreasonableness	Decisions based on belief, doubt, convenience

Conclusion

The Surrey and Sussex “Searching Biological Sex Policy (1248/2025)” collapses the statutory foundation of safeguarding by replacing autonomy with administrative compliance, and anatomy with ideological categorisation.

1. Policy undermines autonomy: consent becomes conditional, withdrawal is punished, and procedural hurdles render dignity unattainable.
2. Policy undermines anatomy: observable physical characteristics are disregarded in favour of “biological sex,” a construct defined neither in law nor in reality.

In doing so, the policy breaches PACE, Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, the Equality Act 2010, and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, creating a framework where humiliation is not an aberration but a foreseeable outcome.

Introducing our vision: safety and welfare for people with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

In the foreword, we stated this:

“As an organisation, we pride ourselves in supporting feminine people (regardless of how they identify) with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, and I hope that our work might provide some comfort for those most affected by this policy, but also to enlighten key policymakers of an alternative way forward that respects the rights and dignity of everyone.”

We cannot claim, within the 72 hours allotted, to be able to produce an alternative document that promises to safeguard the wellbeing, safety, and privacy of all people with the protected characteristic of gender-reassignment. The TNBI community is rich, diverse, and nuanced. We have not been able to consult with everyone. Furthermore we are very aware that we do not have active representation from the intersex community, and our expertise is more guided toward transfeminine people who physically transition. However, this much is true: all LGBT and TNBI people are at elevated risk from physical and sexual abuse, violence, and degrading treatment, especially by those in power. Furthermore we wish to extend our desire for positive social change well beyond our own communities. What happens here may affect anyone with a minority characteristic, be that age, disability, ethnicity, race, or any other minority characteristic.

As such, we regard our draft guidance not as a defacto standard, but the beginning of a conversation. We offer this in line with other guidance – for example treating and categorising people with diverse bodies in a medical setting. We recognise that safeguarding should be in line with the Care Act (2014), the Children Act (1989 and 2004), Working Together to Safeguard Children (2018, updated 2023), Care and Support Statutory Guidance (Care Act 2014), and The Mental Capacity Act (2005). We believe that safeguarding experts should be involved with Police policymaking decisions which we view as a blinding omission from Sussex Police.

It is with these caveats, that we propose our draft guidance, as an example of policy which safeguards people more effectively, is more in line with human rights, existing data protection legislation, PACE, the Gender Recognition Act and articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. It reflects a need to move away from gender-critical ideology (assigned sex at birth) and subjective opinions, toward objectively measurable fact, and based in the present moment, rather than freezing rights based at the moment of birth.

We understand that TNBI people present a complex challenge, in the face of the current social context in the United Kindgom, and that conversations have thus far excluded us. It is therefore vital that this conversation continues with all stakeholders.

Suggested Searching Procedures Policy – Safeguarding Dignity and Lawfulness.

Version: Draft 1.1  Prepared by: Liora Wren (Transiness Correspondent)

Email: transinessadmin@protonmail.com

Date: 5/10/25

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1. Purpose

To ensure all police searches are conducted lawfully, safely, and with dignity, in full compliance with:

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)
• European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – Articles 3 & 8
• Equality Act 2010 – including the Public Sector Equality Duty (s.149)
• UK GDPR / Data Protection Act 2018

This draft policy is intended as a guide to replace prior guidance referring to “biological sex.”

Searches will henceforth be determined by objective, observable anatomy — the physical body present before the officer — ensuring decisions are made on fact, not belief.

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2. Scope

Applies to all searches requiring a same-sex officer under PACE, including:

• More Thorough Searches (MTS)
• Exposure of Intimate Parts (EIP)
• Strip Searches
• Intimate Searches

This policy applies to all officers and designated police staff engaged in or present during searches.

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3. Guiding Principles

1. Dignity is a right, not a request.
2. Observable anatomy is the objective basis for determining appropriate officers.
3. Autonomy must be respected – consent must be freely given, informed, and withdrawable without penalty.
4. Trauma-informed practice is essential in every search.
5. Operational convenience shall never override human rights.
6. Safeguarding must prioritise those at heightened risk of retraumatisation.

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4. Consensual Searches

4.1 Principle

All searches must preserve dignity, privacy, and autonomy.
They shall be conducted by officers sharing the detainee’s present anatomy — i.e. officers whose observable physical characteristics (such as breasts, penis, or vagina) correspond with those of the detainee. Different officers may required to search different anatomical areas, ensuring that the area not being searched is covered.

An opposite-anatomy search may occur only where:

1. There is an immediate and serious risk to life or safety,
2. No suitable officer sharing the detainee’s anatomy is available, and
3. The detainee provides informed, revocable consent.

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4.2 Consent and Autonomy

• Consent must be freely given, informed, and withdrawable without consequence.
• Withdrawal of consent does not prevent it, it pauses or postpones the search — it must not trigger a coerced alternative.
• Officers must confirm understanding in clear, accessible language.
• Coercion, threats, or operational pressure invalidate consent.

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4.3 Objective Officer Selection

Officers must be selected based solely on observable anatomy relevant to the search, determined by:

1. Visible or disclosed physical characteristics (e.g. breasts, penis, vagina), or
2. A simple, factual question if needed (e.g. “Do you have breasts?” or “Do you have a penis or vagina?”).
3. Decisions must never rely on belief, perception, paperwork, or gender identity.
4. No officer may “guess” anatomy; where uncertainty remains.

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4.4 Delay and Dignity

If no suitable officer is immediately available:

1. The search must be delayed until one is arranged;
2. Staffing levels or workload do not justify an opposite-anatomy search;
3. During delay, detainees remain fully clothed and housed privately;
4. Welfare checks should be conducted respectfully — not constant surveillance.

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4.5 Trauma-Informed Practice

Where a detainee discloses trauma or shows distress:

1. Officers must explain each step calmly;
2. Offer pause / cover / breaks on request;
3. Limit observers to the minimum necessary;
4. Record distress as a safeguarding concern, not misconduct.

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4.6 Record of Consent

Records shall be minimal and neutral, noting only:

1. Whether consent was given, declined, or withdrawn;
2. The anatomy-based reasoning for officer selection.

No record may contain gender history, identity labels, or assumptions.
All data handling must comply with UK GDPR (special category data) and be strictly necessary and proportionate.

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4.7 Oversight

Every search must be reviewed for Article 3 & 8 compliance by a supervising sergeant.
Any departure from anatomy alignment must include a written, lawful justification demonstrating necessity and proportionality.

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5. Safeguarding for All Parties

Preamble

Safeguarding must protect everyone involved. While operational staff wellbeing is important, detainees’ vulnerabilities — especially those who have experienced sexual violence, trauma, or gender-based abuse — must guide every decision. It is understood that 1 in 2 (50%) of those with the protected characteristic of gender-reassignment have been exposed to sexual violence at some point in their lives.

Policies and practices must be:

• Trauma-informed – recognising prior harm;
• Anatomy-respectful – matching current physical characteristics;
• Autonomy-centred – ensuring understanding, choice, and withdrawal rights.

Institutional convenience must never override individual dignity.

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5.1 Trauma-Informed Safeguarding Clause

1. Assignment of Personnel
   • Searches must be conducted only by staff trained in trauma-informed practice.
   • Whenever possible, assign officers sharing the detainee’s anatomy.
2. Preparation & Consent
   • Provide a clear, calm explanation of the search, rights, and purpose.
   • Offer meaningful choice; confirm comprehension.
   • Consent withdrawal → pause or postpone, never punishment.
3. During Search
   • Conduct searches in private, with minimal observers.
   • Allow pause / cover / breaks on request.
   • Record observable distress as a safeguarding concern.
4. Post-Search Support
   • Offer medical / mental health support where retraumatisation occurs.
   • Debrief officers to reinforce trauma awareness.
5. Officer Wellbeing
   • Officers may decline for trauma or health reasons.
   • Forces must maintain sufficient trained personnel so detainee dignity is protected.

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6. Recording and Justification

6.1 All decisions, consents (or lack thereof), and justifications must be documented on the relevant record (stop-and-search form, consent form, custody record).

Amendment:

“All recorded decisions must rely on

objective, observable, and lawful factors—the detainee’s

present anatomy, factual statements, or relevant evidence—not personal belief, perception, or convenience.”

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7. Transparency and Accountability

7.1 Honest Transparency Clause

Individuals can expect that:

1. Non-Negotiable Dignity – Searches align with the detainee’s observable anatomy. Delay is always preferable to opposite-anatomy searching.
2. Rights, Not Favours – Anatomy-respectful searches are entitlements, not discretionary.
3. Lawful Delay – Detainees remain clothed, private, and informed if waiting.
4. Objective Decision-Making – Every decision must cite observable facts, not perception.
5. Independent Oversight – All records open to ICV / supervisory review; annual audit required.
6. Evidence of Lawfulness – Compliance with PACE, ECHR, EqA, and GDPR must be demonstrable in practice.

Statements of dignity must be matched by demonstrable safeguards, not merely reflected in policy language.

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7.2 Public Information

• Publish a plain-language rights guide explaining:
  • What detainees can expect;
  • How to ask for an anatomy-matched officer;
  • How to withdraw consent safely;
  • Routes for complaint (IOPC, PCC, EHRC).

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8. Implementation & Review

• Effective Date: [Insert Date]
• Review Cycle: Annual, or sooner if law or evidence changes
• Responsible Authority: Professional Standards / Custody Command

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Outcome

This suggested policy outlines a guideline to restore lawfulness, objectivity, and human dignity to police searches.
By grounding decisions in observable anatomy rather than belief, identity, or paperwork, it ensures compliance with PACE and ECHR, protects vulnerable detainees, and rebuilds community trust.

Dignity is not a request; it is a right.